That might sound cloying, or even surprising, to non-statistical folk more than a century after karl Pearson's The Grammar of Science (1892) . (On the basis of a gift from Francis Galton, Pearson founded at University College London, in 1911, the first Department of Applied Statistics in the English speaking world.) But insiders to the field know what Pearson and Galton knew -that Twain and Disraeli were wrong. It is simply not true that there are "lies, damned lies, and statistics. " Or, to be exact, not in that order of ascending blunder. On the contrary, scientists -and most politicians after Stalin -know that it is easier to lie or deceive when not using statistics. Statistical methods invite and challenge scientists and citizens alike to consider the quantitative evidence -to estimate the size, variance, and probable relationships between observations.
Common sense confirms that model-based evidence is never the whole of human judgment, and adherents to both Frequentist and Bayesian Schools of statistics agree (for instance , Cox 1986; Gelman 2013; Press 2003; Rosenthal and Rubin 1985; Senn 2001) . Some human values affecting judgment -such as mercy or justice in medicine, or fear of loss in cognitive psychology -do not fit snugly into the math. Plus, human knowledge -from big data to small -is limited. Only 10 years ago the profit that could be earned from social media was predicted by few. Innovation is not easily predictable. If it were, it wouldn't be an innovation. But for many phenomena, statistical evidence -when available -contributes a lot.
Statistical significance on trial
Currently there is a big question brewing in science and society regarding the proper role -if any -for one part of statistical analysis: "statistical significance. " Recently, a journal of social psychology has discouraged use not only of statistical significance but of inferential statistics in general (Trafimow and Marks 2015) . More recently the editors of eight of the leading journals of health economics have joined forces to issue an editorial statement urging increased attention to statistically "insignificant" findings that are nevertheless humanly and economically important to real people and health economics (Editors 2015) . Journalists and critics have weighed in, too, raising concerns about the rise of "p-hacking" -that is, unscientific searches by scientists hoping to attain high levels of statistical significance merely for the sake of publishing (Bowyer 2015; Nuzzo 2014; Simonsohn et al. in press) . And in medicine, business, and law, the statistically significantly mishandled Vioxx pill has cost its producer several billions of US dollars in liability payments to Vioxx victims and their families -one of the biggest liability payouts by a single corporation in American economic history (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008: 28-31) .
Perhaps the most important change to the thinking about statistical significance is a unanimous 2011 decision by the Supreme Court of the USA (Bialik 2011 ; Supreme Court of the United States 2011). In a major case of securities Downloaded by [Stephen Ziliak] at 09:16 07 April 2016 law regarding biomedical companies' public disclosure of adverse events the High Court overturned previous law, deciding 9-0 against using statistical significance as a standard for whether or not a firm has to disclose bad news. The Court ruled that statistical significance does not and cannot determine the fact of materiality and importance to lives and fortunes.
What is statistical significance?
Ironically, it's the expert econometrician and professional statistician -not the workaday significance tester -who mostly agrees with the critics. Statistical significance is by itself neither necessary nor sufficient for proving a scientific, commercial, medical, or legal claim. Rational assessment of the probability or likelihood of a hypothesis cannot be derived from statistical methods aloneBayesian methods included. After all, the choice of loss functions and samples and alternative hypotheses to study requires argumentation and appeals to warrants of belief -both ethical and scientific -that are not contained in the data or estimates. In particular, significance tests using p values, t statistics, F statistics, and confidence intervals do not by themselves provide a sound basis for concluding that an effect is important, that is, scientifically, legally, practically, or economically important. Significance and importance are weakly correlated.
Reasoning of values and purposes including, but by no means not limited to, considerations of efficiency and fit beyond those contained in the analyzed data and in conventional statistical models must be used to reach such a conclusion.
Critics are right: too many sciences -and in the USA, the law itself, up until the recent Supreme Court decision on Matrixx v. Siracusano -have fallen into the habit of claiming that statistical significance -or the lack of it -statistical "insignificance" -is a decisive, yes/no deal breaker for purported research findings; it's not. But the mistaken usage comes in numerous forms, from logical to practical, and is similarly distributed across the different sciences (Goodman 2002; Greenland and Senn 2015; Lew 2012s ). Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) report from a large survey of science in the twentieth century that 8 or 9 of every 10 articles published in the leading journals of economics, health, medicine, and psychology misused (at a cost) the test of significance. Ioannides (2005) took Freiman and others' (1978) study of "71 'Negative' Trials" to the next level, arguing "why most published research findings are false. " yet, one should not conclude from past blunders, as some scientists have, that inferential statistics should be taken off the table. Or that tests of significance have no place in the ethical-scientific toolbox.
Significance testing does have a place. But admittedly, the old confusion begins with the very word, "significant. " It's not like it sounds. "Significant" in the statistical sense does not mean "important. " And "insignificant" does not mean "unimportant. " This elementary point should be more common knowledge than in reality it is. Of course some of the observed variance of numerical observations will be random, some systematic. For example, in agricultural economics the estimated level of a farmer's yield per acre when growing barley A will not always surpass the yield of barley B, grown on the same or different fields. Some of the difference in yield will occur for random reasons -from uneven occurrence of rabbit holes or bird attacks, say. The other part of the variance might be explained by systematic reasons -from differences in the yield of A and B caused by genetic or soil differences, or by differential access to water and sun.
Misconduct rising: when Student's t became Fisher's p Since Student's (1908) article on "the probable error of a mean" it has proven helpful to estimate how likely the observed differences might be, and by how much. The most commonly used test is called Student's test of statistical significance, or "Student's t. " The t-test produces a t-statistic which one may use as an input for judging the likelihood of events. Commonly the test assumes one has a random sample of independent and repeated observations exhibiting a normal "bell shaped" distribution.
The t-statistic is a ratio which divides observed mean differences between phenomena under comparison (such as the average difference between barley yields A-B) by a measure of its own variation, called the standard error. By convention, in most of the life and human sciences, if Student's t rises to twice the level of observed variation in the data (twice the standard error) then the finding is called "statistically significant;" if not, not.
The "p value" estimates something more abstract and difficult to grasp: p measures the likelihood that the value of Student's t-statistic will be greater than the value of t actually observed assuming to be true the assumptions of the model and the stipulated null hypothesis of "no average or median difference" between the things being compared.
Assuming that there is no average difference between the two barley yields -or between two pain relief pills or two star clusters or two investment rates of return -the p value calculates the likelihood that we would observe a deviation in the data at least as large as the deviation, measured by Student's t-statistic, that is actually revealed. (In many testing situations scientists are comparing more than two things at once.) Prior knowledge does not figure into the calculation of p -a fact which both Frequentist and Bayesian Schools lament -one more reason to consider all of the available information, both inside and outside the model. If the calculated value of p is low -below the overused 0.05 level, for example -convention claims the data on hand are not consistent with the null hypothesis of "no difference" between the objects being compared and concludes that the result is "statistically significant, " that is, statistically significantly different from the null hypothesis; if not, not.
Downloaded by [Stephen Ziliak] at 09:16 07 April 2016
That is, if the p-value rises to p = 0.06 or 0.20 a convention enforcing the bright line rule of p < 0.05 would declare "insignificance" and ignore the finding -however important the effect size might be in other regards. For example, in the clinical trial on Vioxx, the heart attack variable came in at about p = 0.20. Following convention, the dangerous side effects were thus neglected by its marketer -an unfortunate fact which was finally brought to the attention of the US Supreme Court (McCloskey and Ziliak 2010: 14-18) . The data are too noisy and there might not be an effect different from the null, convention claims. But that is not so.
So why should we measure differences between objects using p? By all indications, it appears we should not. As the eminent Bayesian and geo-and astrophysicist Jeffreys ([1939] 1961) observed long ago:
If P is small, that means that there have been unexpectedly large departures from prediction [under the null hypothesis]. But why should these be stated in terms of P? The latter gives the probability of departures, measured in a particular way, equal to or greater than the observed set, and the contribution from the actual value [of the test statistic] is nearly always negligible. What the use of P implies, therefore, is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred. This seems a remarkable procedure. On the face of it the fact that such results have not occurred might more reasonably be taken as evidence for the law [or null hypothesis], not against it. The same applies to all the current significance tests based on P integrals.
The trouble in workaday practice spread further when researchers, lawyers, and bureaucrats began to misinterpret larger p values (most commonly p > 0.05) as the probability that the null hypothesis is true. But a large-scale replication confirmed by James Berger (2003: 4) and others found that when p "is near 0.05, at least 72% and typically over 90%" of tested null hypotheses are "true. " Statisticians have long recognized the large and important difference between a p value and an actual calculation of the probability of the null hypothesis (Student 1938 (Student 1925: 106; c.f. Fisher [1925] 1928, Appendix). In fact, Fisher's p-values are still found in interval form by consulting "the table of t. " Exactly why Fisher took liberty to change the table -and thus the method of estimation and interpretation -is a matter of historical debate (Pearson 1990: 83; Ziliak and McCloskey 2008: 227-233) .
Keep inferential statistics in the journals
But a recent decision by the editors of Basic and Applied Social Psychology (BASP) to "ban all vestiges of the null hypothesis significance test procedure (p-values, t-values, F-values , statements about "significant" differences or lack thereof, and so on)" will do little to resolve these problems, and may create Downloaded by [Stephen Ziliak] at 09:16 07 April 2016 more serious problems than already exist (Trafimow and Marks 2015) . This is like recommending decapitation as a headache remedy: it solves the problem, but kills the patient. The new editorial policy, which has gained international attention, asserts that:
BASP will require strong descriptive statistics, including effect sizes … Finally, we encourage the use of larger sample sizes than is typical in much psychology research, because as the sample size increases, descriptive statistics become increasingly stable and sampling error is less of a problem.
The community of statisticians lauds any effort to emphasize probable "effect sizes" instead of statistical significance. Science and society want to how much difference -how big is big and how small is small? -and what that might mean. From drug trials to dental implants, we want to know the likely magnitude and meaning of observed differences between alternatives, leading to more rational decisions. But "strong descriptive statistics" has no scientific meaning, and "larger sample sizes" invite problems of heterogeneity and correlation that cannot be addressed without resorting to the large body of inferential statistics and tools that the psychology journal is currently trying to ban.
Significance controversy in the past
This is not the first time in history that statistical significance has been on trial. "Significance" was only a partial argument from odds from the beginning, Edgeworth (1885: 208) , who coined the term, clearly perceived. Galton and Pearson saw in the test more security than they might have. But by 1905 Student himself -that is william Sealy Gosset aka "Student, " the inventor of Student's t, and eventual Head Brewer of Guinness -warned in a letter to karl Pearson about economic and other substantive losses that can be caused by following a bright line rule of statistical significance: when I first reported on the subject [of 'The Application of the 'Law of Error' to the work of the Brewery' (1904)], I thought that perhaps there might be some degree of probability which is conventionally treated as sufficient in such work as ours and I advised that some outside authority [such as you, karl Pearson] should be consulted as to what certainty is required to aim at in large scale work. However it would appear that in such work as ours the degree of certainty to be aimed at must depend on the pecuniary advantage to be gained by following the result of the experiment, compared with the increased cost of the new method, if any, and the cost of each experiment. (quoted in Ziliak 2008: 207) Student's rejection of a bright-line accept-reject standard was echoed a few years on by Harvard psychologist Boring (1919) , warning about the difference between substantive and merely statistical significance in psychological research. yet, mindless tests and uses of statistical significance raged on, heedless of warnings from its eminent discoverers.
In the 1970s, international committees were formed in medicine, epidemiology, and psychology, to help tame the uncertain beast but their un-concerted Downloaded by [Stephen Ziliak] at 09:16 07 April 2016 efforts could only effect so much change in the way significance tests were used, and, in the event, not much changed (an exception is the journal Epidemiology, edited by kenneth J. Rothman, which seems to have made empirical progress: Rothman (1998) ).
And this is not the first time in history that a scientific journal has tried on its own to ban p-values and other measures of statistical significance. The New England Journal of Medicine (in the 1970s), Epidemiology and The American Journal of Public Health (in the 1990s) and the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (in fits and starts) have experimented with bans of sorts but the record is -with the possible exception of epidemiology, which became more quantitative -not salutary.
In economics, my research on the significance mistake has benefited from published comments by Zellner, Lindley, Granger, Schelling, Elliott, Hymans, wooldridge, Leamer, Horowitz, Gingerich, Mayer, Hoover, Siegler, Smith, Bergman, Spanos, Harford, and others. Probability theorist Olle Haggstrom, medical researcher Jessica Ancker, philosopher of science Steve Fuller, philosopher Deborah Mayo, historian of science Theodore Porter, and many other scientists and scholars have weighed in. while there is some debate among these authors about the frequency of the significance mistake in economics and other sciences (see Ziliak and McCloskey (2013) for citations) all agree on the fundamental fact of meteorological science: that the deep, dark night of mindless significance testing has to go. Here is a fact rather tough to swallow: today's economist -the trusted guardian of the bottom line -devotes much time and energy and wit to putting a clever index of opportunity cost into his model or game; but then, like the amnesiac or weaker college freshman, he fails to see opportunity cost in statistical estimates and interpretations he makes of those very same models. Medicine, psychology, and pharmacology are, I have shown, similarly harmed by this fundamental error of science, keeping bad treatments and drugs on the market and good ones out.
Econometrics:
where everything is counted save the net profit.
Change is coming, and social economists can help. Some already are. In fact in an unprecedented policy-change movement by economics journal editors toward the collective good, the editors of eight of the leading journals of health economics published an "Editorial Statement on Negative Findings" (Editors, Health Economics 2015):
The Editors of the health economics journals named below believe that … innovative conceptual and methodological approaches … have potential scientific and publication merit regardless of whether such studies' empirical findings do or do not reject null hypotheses that may be specified … Moreover, we believe that this should reduce the incentives to engage in two forms of behavior that we feel ought to be discouraged in the spirit of scientific advancement:
1. Authors withholding from submission such studies that are otherwise meritorious but whose main empirical findings are highly likely 'negative' (e.g., null hypotheses not rejected).
2. Authors engaging in 'data mining, ' 'specification searching, ' and other such empirical strategies with the goal of producing results that are ostensibly 'positive' (e.g., null hypotheses reported as rejected).
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Statistics within reason
In other words, the type of reasoning and conclusions aided by statistical analysis should occur in a larger context of research purpose, design, and values. Tests should be conducted with added attention to the experimental or observational design; the number of repetitions of the experiment or survey; previous findings and data; controls for confounding, selection bias, multiplicity and naturally benefit and cost. Most errors -indeed, most costly errors -are non-random blunders not captured by the usual test statistics. A study boasting about the size or value of its "randomized" tests is probably blowing smoke (see Ziliak and Teather-Posadas (2016) for a deconstruction of randomized field experiments in development economics, medicine, and industrial organization).
Statistical evidence exists only within a statistical model, a fact that is dangerously absent from the BASP editorial. Different models yield different values when applied to a single set of experimental or observational evidence just as different economic or physical or biological schools of thought lead to different interpretation.
what is to be done?
Alternatives to bright-line rules
Perhaps the most commonly used alternative to classical t and p is the Bayes factor (Carlin and Louis 2008; Press 2003) . For discrete data and simple hypotheses, the Bayes factor represents the ratio between the probability assigned to the data under an alternative hypothesis and the null hypothesis (Johnson 2013) . One big advantage of Bayesian analysis is that one can compute the probability of a hypothesis, given the evidence, whereas with the null hypothesis test of significance, measured by a p value, one can only speak to the probability of seeing data more extreme than have actually obtained, assuming the null hypothesis of "no difference" (or whatever) to be true. whether statisticians like it or not, their results are used to decide between hypotheses, and it is elementary that if p entails q, q does not necessarily entail p. we cannot get from 'the data are unlikely given the hypothesis' to 'the hypothesis is unlikely given the data' without some additional rule of thought. Those that reject inverse probability have to replace it by some circumlocution, which leaves it to the student to spot where the change of data has been slipped in [, in ] the hope that it will not be noticed.
Jeffreys went on to explain that if one assigns prior odds between the alternative and null hypotheses, multiplication of the Bayes factor by these prior odds yields the posterior odds between the hypotheses. From the posterior odds between hypotheses, scientists can compute the posterior probability that a null hypothesis is true (or in any case useful or persuasive) relative to an explicit alternative. Classical tests of significance, measured by t and p, cannot.
2 Unfortunately, the use of Bayes factors in hypothesis testing is considered by the old school to be controversial -"too subjective, " they say. "we don't know our priors" or "How do we know what the alternative hypothesis should be?" Common usage is about the only recommendation for the old debate about subjective vs. objective statistics. As yogi Berra said, "No one goes there anymore; it's too crowded. "
In fact, Johnson (2013) observes that in certain hypothesis tests the alternative hypothesis can be specified so that an equivalence between Bayes factors and p-values can be established. Technically speaking, Johnson and others have shown, in one parameter exponential family models in which a point null hypothesis has been specified on the model parameter, specifying the size of the test is equivalent to specifying a rejection threshold for the Bayes factor, provided that it is further assumed that the alternative hypothesis is specified so as to maximize the power of the test. The correspondence between Bayes factors and p-values in this setting is just one example of the false demarcation line between objective and subjective.
when an alternative hypothesis exists -and that's the usual situation of science: otherwise, why test? -Bayes factors can be easily reported. Bayes factors permit individual scientists and consumers to use prior information or the principle of insufficient reason together with new evidence to compute the posterior probability that a given hypothesis, H, is true (or to repeat, useful or persuasive) based on the prior probability that they assign to each hypothesis. After allfortunately -we do not have to begin every new observation or experiment from tabula rasa; we know some stuff, but we want to know more stuff, however imperfectly. Bayes factors add that information into the calculation comparing the likelihood of alternative hypotheses. For example, Bayes factors provide a clear interpretation of the evidence contained in the data in favor of or against the null: a Bayes factor of 10 simply means that the data were 10 times more likely under the alternative hypothesis than they were under the null hypothesis. That's a real advance over mushy p's.
Thus the beginning of better scientific conduct entails a synthesis of Bayesian and Frequentist ideas. But prior to that inevitable paradigm shift a number of changes to the style of the scientific paper could go a long way toward overcoming current malpractice. Scientific journals and grantors alike can help by providing incentives to put (1) Primary emphasis on estimating and contextualizing the substantive significance of estimates. For example, published tables and text should emphasize the magnitude and meaning of effect sizes, and the Bayes factor between the null and scientifically or economically significant alternative hypotheses. If p, t, and F are reported, exact values should be given and interpreted -together with estimates of effect size -in terms of odds of occurrence and its substantive meaning on a scale of human and scientific values relevant to the purpose. If the odds of an important effect (a fatal heart attack from taking a drug, for example, or earning a small fortune by selling violins) are 1 in 200, some people -perhaps a lot of people -want or need to hear about it. The health economists are right: there should be no bright line rule that banishes such information, and the Supreme Court agrees. Focusing on substantive significance and alternative hypotheses does not necessarily entail formal specification of a Bayesian "expected loss function. " But more attention should be paid to cost or regret measured by amount of job loss from policy X, or death rates in placebo group y. Likewise, in sciences such as medicine and economics, joy or net benefit ought to be made explicit, measured on some scale of human values not reducible to any level of statistical significance. Money, health, home runs, and less depression, for example, and by how much. (2) Due attention, when relevant, to an expected value interpretation of the recommended hypothesis or "decision" relative to feasible alternatives. Imagine putting your own skin in the game. If you had to lay down money or health or life to gamble on the basis of your result, how much would you wager, and why? For example, Bayesian statistics allow one to estimate posterior probabilities of gain and loss rather than relying on the old accept/reject routine associated with bright-line rules of statistical significance, heedless of substance. As Savage (1954: 116) noted long ago, "The cost of an observation in utility may be negative as well as zero or positive; witness the cook that tastes the broth. " Martha Stewart would agree. (3) Explicit discussion and results distinguishing random from real error. For example, in a small sample analysis, a brewer may wish to know with 10 to 1 or better odds how many samples of wort he needs to mix to Downloaded by [Stephen Ziliak] at 09:16 07 April 2016 be confident that the saccharine level of the beer stays within 0.5° of the 133° standard he is targeting. The example is "Student's": brewing over 100 million gallons of Guinness stout per annum, "Student" and Guinness stakeholders needed to know (Ziliak 2008: 206) . "Real" errors in this context include uneven temperature changes, heterogeneous barley malt, and mismeasurement of saccharine levels -adding up to more error than is allegedly described by p or t. (4) Easy to read visualization of model and coefficient uncertainty. From farming to pharmaceuticals, we want to know what the entire distribution looks like from the point of view of oomph and precision, effect size and uncertainty. Not just the point mean or median, with a superscript of asterisks declaring "significant" or "highly" so. Remember Stephen Jay Gould's far-above-the-median experience with surviving stomach cancer, discussed in his essay "The Median Isn't the Message" (Gould 1985 ). Gould's doctor cited a median survival time from diagnosis of about 8 months; but the prolific scholar and writer lived and worked for another 22 years! A study by Soyer and Hogarth (2011) tested the predictive ability of more than two hundred econometricians using linear models. Prediction was most accurate when the experts were only given a theoretical regression line and scatter plot of data. 
Getting the incentives right: scientific misconduct and statistical significance
Several of the major institutions for the advancement of science in the USA -from the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation to the American Association for the Advancement of Science itself -have sought to define and to enforce national standards for research integrity and ethical scientific conduct. Fabrication or falsification of data, deceitful manipulation, and plagiarism are the most commonly cited forms of misconduct named and pursued. Although gross misuse of statistical significance has led to approval of faulty medical therapies which cause harm to real people -and, in some cases, such as the Vioxx debacle, even death -the scientific community has not added misuse of statistical significance to the list of scientific misconduct. That is a peculiar inconsistency given that researchers engaged in similar types of manipulation or questionable research practices have been penalized by those same agencies. industry. The significance mistake is undesirable, inefficient, and, in most cases -philosophers agree -unethical (see Ziliak and McCloskey (2016) and Ziliak and Teather-Posadas (2016) for theoretical discussion of ethics in empirical economics including drugs and field experiments in development economics). But the significance mistake seems to be outside the bounds of the current definition of scientific misconduct used by government agencies, research universities, and -with the extraordinary exception of the Matrixx v. Siracusano case decided by the US Supreme Court -the legal process when such matters get litigated in a court of law. If we are going to stem and finally stop altogether the widespread misuse of statistical significance we must begin to get the incentives right and in more than improved publication style and journal editorial policy.
